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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Country-Related and Thematic
Developments at the 1988 Session of
the UN Commission on Human Rights
David Weissbrodt
!. THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights is the principal and most
important political organ of the United Nations concerned principally with
human rights.1; The Commission meets for six weeks every year in February
and March. This year, for example, it met from 1 February through 11 March
1988.2 The Commission is comprised of forty-three government represent-
atives who are elected by the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations. The Economic and Social Council is, in turn, a subsidiary body of
the United Nations General Assembly. When the UN Charter was written
in 1945, the subject of human rights was so important that the Charter in
Article 68 specifically prescribes that a Commission on Human Rights should
be established.
The forty-three governments which are members of the Commission on
Human Rights differ significantly, from countries which are known for their
respect for human rights to countries which have very different reputations.
It is remarkable, therefore, that the Commission has historically been the
author of the principal norm-setting instruments of human rights. The Com-
mission in its earliest days under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt drafted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 3 which provides the most widely
1. See H. Tolley, The U.N. Commission on Human Rights (1987).
2. Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Forty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1988/88 (1988); I. Guest, Report on the 44th session of Commission on Human Rights,
February 1-March 12, 1988 (1988); see also Review and Assessment of U.S. Policy at the
44th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Human Rights and International Organizations, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
3. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. 810, at 71 (1948).
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accepted definition of human rights and constitutes the first part of the
International Bill of Human Rights.4 The Commission has also drafted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,s which make the Uni-
versal Declaration into treaties ratified by over eighty-five nations' and also
form part of the International Bill of Human Rights. Most recently, the Com-
mission drafted the new International Convention Against Torture and Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment.7
In addition to the forty-three government delegations, the Commission
sessions in 1988 were attended by observers from seventy-six other nations
and about 150 nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty Interna-
tional and the International Committee of the Red Cross.8
II. THE 1988 SESSION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Thematic Procedures9
At its 1988 session the Commission reviewed reports from a number of its
thematic procedures which have become its most important mechanisms
for implementing human rights. For example, it received an excellent report
from the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances.' 0 The
Working Group has since 1980 been using its influence to pressure gov-
ernments to reveal what has happened to thousands of people who have
been arrested and then subjected to clandestine imprisonment. Many of
these individuals have been tortured and some have died. Their loved ones
want desperately to know what has happened to the "disappeared." In regard
to recent disappearances the Working Group has sent telegrams and made
appeals which have resulted in the release of many individuals and has
caused governments to acknowledge that they are detaining others. In "dis-
appearance" cases of an older vintage the Working Group has been instru-
mental in clarifying the fate and bringing some closure to the suffering of
4. See Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 Minn. L.
Rev. 35, 45-47 (1978).
5. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1967).
6. Chart of Ratification of Major International Human Rights Instruments as of 1 January 1988,
in K. Vasak, The International Dimension of Human Rights at Annex I of 1988 (1982).
7. G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A139/51 (1985).
8. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 286-94 (1988).
9. Bossuyt, The Development of Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, 6 Human Rights L. J. 179 (1985); Kamminga, The Thematic Procedures of
the UN Commission on Human Rights, 34 Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 299 (1987); Weissbrodt,
The Three "Theme" Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 80
Am. J. Int'l L. 685 (1986).
10. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/19 (1988).
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the families who are still hoping that their loved ones might somehow be
returned to them.
The Working Group for the first time this year gathered its procedural
precedents into a section of its report on the Group's methods of work. That
section will help the many individuals and organizations who ask for the
Working Group's help and will guide the Working Group as its membership
of five diplomats serving in their individual capacities gradually changes
overtime. From 1980 through 1986 the Working Group was kept on a rather
short leash and had its mandate renewed only one year at a time. In 1986
its mandate was renewed by consensus for two years and in March 1988,
the Commission renewed the Working Group for another two years, again
by consensus.11
The Commission has established very similar thematic procedures for
a number of other significant human rights problems. For example, in 1982
it established the Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
who functions in a manner very similar to the Working Group on Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances. The special rapporteur's report for 1988
showed that the Kenyan lawyer who serves in that capacity has done a very
thorough and impressive job during 1987 of trying to stop impending killings
and of investigating past summary or arbitrary executions.12 The special
rapporteur also is developing some basic international norms for how sus-
picious deaths should be investigated and for adequate autopsies. For the
first time in 1988 the Commission by consensus extended the special rap-
porteur's mandate for a two year period.13
The Special Rapporteur on Torture was established by the Commission
in 198514 and the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance was estab-
lished in 1986.11 While there were problems with their reports for the Com-
mission in 1988, the Commission decided by consensus to develop a uniform
practice of extending their mandates for two years.16 Indeed, the Commission
even extended for two years the mandates of the new Special Rapporteur
on Mercenaries17 and the Special Rapporteur Monitoring Investments in
South Africa, 18 who have quite different roles.19
Furthermore, at the 1988 session the British delegation proposed a res-
11. CHR Res. 1988/34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 90 (1988).
12. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/22 (1988).
13. CHR Res. 1988/68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 145 (1988).
14. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/17, at 1 (1988).
15. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/45, at 1 (1988).
16. CHR Res. 1988/32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 86 (1988); CHR Res. 1988/55, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 122 (1988).
17. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/14 (1988).
18. Adverse Consequences for the Enjoyment of Human Rights of Political, Military, Economic
and Other Forms of Assistance Given to other Racist and Colonialist Regime of South
Africa, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/8/Rev.1, and E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1987/8/Add.1 (1987).
.19. See CHR Res. 1988/30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988, at 85 (1988).
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olution calling for the release of political prisoners. 20 The British delegation
had hoped to propose a Special Rapporteur on Political Prisoners, but the
resolution ran into difficulty in defining who qualifies as a political prisoner.
The British wanted to define a political prisoner as someone who had been
imprisoned for peacefully exercising his or her rights. Several African coun-
tries wanted the assurance that members of liberation movements would
qualify as political prisoners. In the end, a relatively weak resolution calling
for the release of political prisoners was adopted by consensus using the
British definition of a political prisoner, but the idea of a special rapporteur
will have to wait for next year. Next year it is probable that the Commission
will establish a Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary Detention, which would
cover political prisoners, but which would not be so difficult to define.
B. Country-Specific Resolutions
The Commission had a full agenda of country-specific resolutions, whereby
pressure was placed on various governments to improve their human rights
performance. For example, the Commission in 1967 established an ad hoc
working group of experts to investigate charges of violations such as arbitrary
killings and torture in South Africa. 21 Once again in 1988 the Commission
adopted several resolutions on apartheid and other human rights abuses in
South Africa and Namibia.22
Similarly, the Commission has for many years adopted resolutions on
human rights in Israel and the occupied territories. These resolutions have
over the years developed an extreme rhetoric and have thus been the subject
of dissent by several governments in Western Europe and North America.
While there might have been sympathy this year in some Western European
countries for several of the resolutions against Israel, the sponsors were not
able to change the very strong language of the resolutions, and thus, the
resolutions were adopted with the same number of negative votes.
23
During 1988 the Commission on Human Rights renewed the mandate
of its Special Rapporteur on Chile.24 The United States was one of seven
governments which abstained on the resolution. One of the U.S. delegates
explained that the resolution had been written before the report of the special
rapporteur had become available and did not reflect the conclusions of the
20. CHR Res. 1988/39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 98 (1988).
21. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1988/8, at 4 (1988).
22. See, e.g., CHR Res. 1988/8, 1988/9, 1988/10, 1988/11, 1988/12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/
88, at 38-54 (1988).
23. See, e.g., CHR Res. 1988/1, 1988/2, 1988/3, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1988/88, at 16-27 (1988).
24. CHR Res. 1988/78, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 161 (1988).
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rapporteur 2s or the situation in Chile, so much as the political views of the
drafters, including Mexico. The British delegation voted in favor of the res-
olution, but explained after its vote that it agreed with the substantive position
of the United States. The British, however, did not want to vote against the
resolution because such a vote would send the wrong message to the Chilean
Government.
The Commission on Human Rights once again adopted a resolution
continuing the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan. 26 The
resolution was adopted in the context of the Soviet promises to withdraw
from Afghanistan.27 The resolution was adopted over Soviet opposition by
a vote of twenty-six in favor, eight against, and seven abstaining. The Soviet
delegation had proposed its own resolution continuing the special rapporteur,
but with slightly weaker language. The Commission decided not to accept
the Soviet proposal.
The Commission on Human Rights in 1988 renewed the mandate of its
Special Representative on Iran. 28 Last year the special representative was
nearly defeated by an evenly divided vote to take no action. Last year the
Eastern European countries and several Latin American countries voted to
take no action on Iran, but this year they supported the resolution, abstained,
or did not participate in the vote, so that the resolution passed easily by
votes of 10-18-9 on the no-action vote and 20-5-14 on the resolution itself.
There were two major problems surrounding the Special Representative on
Iran. First, no government wanted to take responsibility of introducing the
resolution because of fear that Iran would cause their citizens to be taken
as hostages. In the end the chair accepted the resolution without any gov-
ernment introducing it. Furthermore, Iran has refused to permit the special
representative to visit the country.29
The Commission on Human Rights also renewed by consensus the
mandate of its Special Representative on Human Rights in El Salvador.3 0
There had been some discussion about shifting the issue of El Salvador from
the scrutiny of the special representative under the Commission's agenda
item for gross violations to the less serious agenda item for advisory services
to assist the Salvadoran Government to remedy its violations. The Com-
mission decided, however, not to decrease its oversight of human rights
violations in El Salvador.3 '
The Commission presently has three countries for which it has estab-
lished experts to provide advisory services to improve their ability to protect
25. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/7, at 59-62 (1988).
26. CHR Res. 1988/67, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 142 (1988).
27. U.N. Doc. EUCN.4/1988/25, at 12 (1988).
28. CHR Res. 1988/69, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 146 (1988).
29. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/24, at 2 (1988).
30. CHR Res. 1988/65, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988188, at 138 (1988).
31. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/23 (1988).
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human rights: Guatemala,3 2 Haiti,33 and Equatorial Guinea.34 Many people
believe that the human rights situation in those three countries have not
improved during the last year and that the United Nations has had no
substantial impact in assisting those countries. Nevertheless, the Commission
renewed the mandate of the three experts on these countries in the hope
that improvements might be forthcoming during this coming year. If not, at
least Haiti may be moved to agenda item 12 for gross violations of human
rights, so that a more forthright and complete assessment of the situation
can be prepared.
The Commission also considered nine countries referred by its Sub-
Commission under a confidential procedure established by Economic and
Social Council Resolution 1503. 31 That Resolution requires the Commission
to consider in closed meetings whether a government has engaged in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights. Governments generally try very hard to avoid being listed under the
1503 process. Several human rights situations were considered initially under
the confidential procedures of 1503 and were later moved to the noncon-
fidential, country-related procedures discussed above.
Indeed, the most dramatic action taken by the Commission under 1503
at its 1988 session was the decision to remove Albania from the confidential
procedures. Albania had been under discussion for five years and had never
formally responded to the complaints against it filed by Amnesty Interna-
tional, the Canadian Conference of Catholic Churches, and by an organi-
zation representing the repressed Greek minority in Albania. During this
past year, however, Albania has begun to come out of its self-imposed
isolation from the rest of the world. It did send a letter to the UN Under-
Secretary General for Human Rights, but specifically indicated that the letter
could not be considered in connection with the 1503 process. Diplomats
of the government of Albania did some lobbying in the capitals of govern-
ments, such as Italy, with which it has diplomatic relations. The majority of
the Commission believed that the failure of Albania to respond to the al-
legations against it for five years warranted a decision to remove Albania
from the 1503 process.36 The Commission also recommended that all the
1503 files on Albania should be made public. This action would represent
the development of a sensible and regularized means for terminating the
1503 process by publishing the confidential material, if the Commission
32. CHR Res. 1988/50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 114 (1988); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/
41 (1988).
33. CHR Res. 1988/51, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 115 (1988); U.N. Doc. ECN.4/1988/
38(1988).
34. CHR Res. 1988/52, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 117 (1988).
35. E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1A) at 8, U.N. Doc. E4832/Add.1 (1970).
36. CHR Res. 1988/17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 66 (1988).
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decides that no adequate progress on human rights has occurred.37 The
decision on Albania was by a vote of fifteen in favor, eleven against, and
seventeen abstaining. Those governments who opposed the decision argued
that Albania was just beginning to come out of its isolation and should be
given at least one more year to respond and to improve the situation. The
majority, however, said that five years was enough time. Obviously, the
long-time isolation of Albania made it easier for a decision to be taken
against it at the Commission. Nevertheless, at the Economic and Social
Council session in May of 1988 a vote was taken notto release the previously
confidential records in regard to Albania.
The Commission also continued its consideration under the 1503 process
of the situation of human rights in Brunei, Honduras, Paraguay, and Zaire.38
The Commission discontinued its consideration of several cases-not all of
those cases should have been allowed to escape from the 1503 process; the
poorest example is Iraq, which is responsible for torture, political impris-
onment, and extrajudicial executions.
For four straight years the Sub-Commission of the Commission has de-
termined that Pakistan was responsible for a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights. Each year the Commission has refused to pursue
the consideration of Pakistan. The Commission in 1988 also rejected cases
relating to Benin and Grenada. 39
Ill. THE U.S. INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA
The basic goal of the United States delegation at the Commission on Human
Rights in 1988 was to add Cuba to the relatively large list of countries which
are subject to scrutiny by the Commission for their human rights problems.
Indeed, in 1987 the U.S. delegation had similarly tried to convince the
Commission to adopt a resolution appealing to the Cuban Government to
improve its human rights performance. That effort had failed by a vote of
nineteen to take no action on Cuba, eighteen in favor of the U.S. position,
and six abstaining. In other words, the shift of a single vote would have
given the United States a victory in 1987.
The United States identified Venezuela as the most obvious vote they
should have received. There was even a story last year that President Reagan
had called the president of Venezuela during the 1987 Commission session
37. In past years, Argentina, the Philippines, and Uruguay had requested that their 1503 files
be released after there had been a major positive change in the government of those
countries. In the case of Albania, however, the Commission decision was taken over the
apparent objection of the government.
38. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 244 (1988).
39. Id.
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and that the president of Venezuela had telexed the Venezuelan delegation
to change its vote at the last moment. The Venezuelan president's instruction
did not reach his delegation in time to stop its vote to take no action on the
U.S. resolution against Cuba in 1987. The other votes for Cuba during the
1987 Commission session, which the United States might have sought to
change in 1988 were those of Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Sri Lanka. In
addition, there were a number of governments which abstained in 1987,
which could have been shifted to votes for the U.S. position, including
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Rwanda.
Lobbying prior to the Commission was undertaken by both the United
States and Cuba. For example, U.S. ambassadors in nearly all of the capitals
of the governments which are members of the Commission visited the foreign
ministries of those countries to indicate how important the Cuban issue at
the Commission was to the United States. The United States and Cuba
probably used their bilateral influence with those countries to persuade them
to vote in their favor.
During the Commission session the Cuban observer delegation at the
Commission held a press conference at which the Cuban delegation dis-
tributed a pamphlet to show that the U.S. ambassador to the Commission,
Armando Valladares, had been a police officer under the government of
Cuba in the period of Batista. The pamphlet also states that Valladares was
a terrorist who planted a bomb, that he was not a poet until he was im-
prisoned, that he was not a very good writer, and that he had not been ill-
treated in prison. The Cuban pamphlet reprints a confidential telex of the
United States State Department to U.S. embassies abroad responding to each
of these claims and discusses Valladares' stay of twenty-two years in Cuban
prisons as well as the torture he suffered. The State Department telex also
reflects the broad U.S. effort to lobby home governments to obtain votes at
the Commission.
Ambassador Valladares held several press conferences in Geneva during
the forty-fourth session of the Commission. At one of those telex was genuine.
Valladares also sought to refute the Cuban charges against him. Valladares
stated in his press conferences and in his introduction to the resolution that
there have been allegations against Cuba for its human rights violations by
numerous organizations such as Amnesty International, the European Par-
liament, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
Valladares made several public statements to the Commission. In regard
to item 10, which covers the issue of torture and detention, Valladares
presented a very moving speech about the torture he suffered. In order to
avoid inciting further dispute, Valladares never mentioned Cuba, although
everyone was aware of the government he was discussing.
After consulting broadly about its initiative on Cuba, the U.S. delegation
introduced a draft resolution which the United States acknowledged to be
quite modest. The resolution does not necessarily assert that there are viola-
1988
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tions of human rights in Cuba, but only says that the allegations of such
violations should be investigated. First, the draft resolution simply expressed
concern over "allegations of violations of basic human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in Cuba." Second, the draft resolution urges the government
of Cuba to permit the ICRC access to Cuban prisons, requests the UN
Secretary-General to bring the resolution to the attention of the government
of Cuba, and invites the Cuban Government to provide information about
human rights in Cuba. Third, the draft resolution places Cuba on the agenda
for the 1989 session of the Commission.
After weeks of lobbying, Ambassador Vernon Walters joined the U.S.
delegation to make the principal U.S. speech on Cuba. Walters' statement
of Tuesday, 8 March 1988, at about 3:30 p.m. began with words which
showed that the U.S. delegation understood the principal political barrier
to a Commission resolution on Cuba: "Let me start by saying, Mr. Chairman,
that, quite frankly, I very much understand the sense of Hispanic solidarity.
We are after all the world's fifth largest Hispanic power. We feel, however,
that Hispanic solidarity should be with the people of Cuba, not with their
unelected rulers. I am not here to ask this Commission to participate in a
vendetta against the Government of Cuba."
As to the situation of human rights in Cuba, Ambassador Walters said,
"Torture and clandestine executions continue to occur. Amnesty Interna-
tional states that unconfirmed reports indicate that a number of secret ex-
ecutions took place during 1987. Thousands of political prisoners exist-
perhaps as many as 10,000 to 15,000 in Cuba's more than 200 prisons and
labor camps. Some of these prisoners date back to the earliest days of the
regime.... In addition to these long-term prisoners, there is a new generation
of political prisoners known as "nuevos plantados" springing up. These are
largely young prisoners, most born since the Revolution, who can no longer
suffer certain aspects of the regime in Cuba. They, too, are found in Cuba's
many political prisons and labor camps and suffer harsh conditions of de-
tention."40
While Cuba was inscribed on the speaker list of the Commission so that
its delegation could have spoken promptly after Ambassador Walters, the
Cubans exchanged places with several delegations to delay their presen-
tation. That afternoon the rumor began to circulate that Cuba had decided
to invite the chair of the Commission and several members to visit Cuba
and see the situation for themselves.
The tension in the large room where the Commission was meeting
continued to grow during the late afternoon and evening of Tuesday, the
8th of March. Small clumps of delegates could be seen around the room
40. Speech of Ambassador Walters to U.N. Commission on Human Rights (files of author,
1988). But cf Amnesty International, Cuba, Political Imprisonment-An Update, Al Index:
AMR 25/02/88 (January 1988); Amnesty International, 1987 Report 150-54 (1987).
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discussing the Cuban invitation which had not been formally announced.
Newspaper reporters stood a few feet away from the clumps of delegates
hoping to overhear the discussions or to catch one of the delegates long
enough to ask what was happening. During this time a number of nongov-
ernmental organizations were making speeches about human rights situa-
tions in various parts of the world. Not too many people were listening and
the hum in the room was so loud that the Italian vice-chair presiding over
the session had to call for quiet.
Finally, at about 8:00 p.m. the delegate of Colombia, speaking on behalf
of Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, reported to the Commission that
Cuba would be willing to invite the Commission to visit and see for them-
selves. The delegate of Cuba confirmed that his government had sent a letter
to the chair of the Human Rights Commission inviting the chair and five
members of the Commission to Cuba, to visit prisons, see documents, and
make contact with government officials. The Cuban government offered in
its letter to pay for the visit by stating that the mission would be without
financial consequences. The U.S. delegation offered to meet with the del-
egations of Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru to discuss the Cuban
offer.
That evening there were negotiations between the United States and the
four South American countries. Cuba was not directly involved in the dis-
cussions. There was very little question that Cuba would not have issued
the invitation had Cuba not been reasonably certain that the U.S. resolution
had sufficient support to be adopted. Although, in some ways, the visit was
far more than the United States had asked in its resolution, the Cuban
invitation left several significant issues unresolved: Would the chair and the
other members of the Commission be permitted to visit Cuba freely or would
they be limited by the terms of the Cuban letter of invitation to prisons,
documents, and government officials? Would the Commission members be
serving in their individual capacities, so that they could report what they
actually saw, or would they be representing their respective governments,
and therefore, would report only what their governments wanted them to
see? How long would the visit be? What members of the Commission would
be selected? Would there be a bias in the members who are selected-for
Cuba or against Cuba? Would the visit to Cuba be conducted in accordance
with the established norms for UN fact-finding in regard to human rights?4
41. See Model Rules of Procedure for United Nations Bodies Dealing with Violations of Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1021/Rev. 1 (1970); reprinted in International Law and Fact-
Finding in the Field of Human Rights, 239-48 (B. Ramacharan ed. 1982). In some respects
the invitation of Cuba was analogous to the invitation which the Government of South
Viet-Nam gave to the United Nations General Assembly in 1963 and which resulted in a
fact-finding mission to that country. See U.N. Doc. A/5630, at 4-8 (1963); see also Weiss-
brodt and McCarthy, Fact-Finding by International Nongovernmental Human Rights Or-
ganizations, 22 Virginia J. Int'l L. 1, 22-23 (1981).
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Would the Colombian proposal be joined with the U.S. resolution? Would
the United States continue to press for its original resolution in addition to
the separate Colombian proposal? What about the Cuban resolution,42 which
had been tabled criticizing the United States? Unfortunately, the negotiations
were not successful.
The following morning, before the session of the Commission convened
on 9 March, the South American countries met with the large nonaligned
group of nations of the Human Rights Commission. The nonaligned dele-
gations gave their support to the South American initiative. The agreement
of the nonaligned nations indicated that the South American initiative had
successfully undermined the support for the original U.S. resolution on Cuba.
Since the negotiations had failed the night before and since the nonaligned
nations had supported the South American proposal, the negotiations were
stalled during the morning session of the Commission. The Commission
continued its business of formally introducing resolutions and adopting them,
but everyone remained in suspense as to what would happen with the Cuban
issue.
Ambassador Valladares formally introduced the original U.S. resolution
against Cuba,43 which simply indicated the general need for an inquiry about
human rights in Cuba. Valladares added a personal statement about how
his father had been promised permission to leave Cuba, but the Cuban
authorities had stalled the exit permit. The Cuban delegation introduced its
resolution against the United States with a very bitter attack on all aspects
of the United States, including the high rate of imprisonment, the execution
of juvenile offenders, the large number of people awaiting execution on
death rows, the failure to deal with the homeless, and the efforts to assassinate
Fidel Castro.
The Commission ordinarily suspends its sessions at 1:00 p.m. for lunch,
but it was not until 1:10 p.m. that the Colombian delegation formally pre-
sented their draft decision on behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Co-
lombia, Mexico, and Peru. The Colombian proposal did not resolve any of
the significant issues which had arisen in negotiations:
Having regard to the invitation of the Government of Cuba, the Commission
on Human Rights decides:
(a) To accept the invitation that the Chairman and five members of the Com-
mission, appointed following regional consultations, should visit Cuba in order
to observe the human rights situation;
(b) That the Chairman of the Commission, together with the five other members
of the mission, shall prepare a report to be submitted for consideration by the
42. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/L.35.
43. U.N. Doc. ECN.4/1988/L.26.
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Commission, which shall decide on the manner in which the report will be
examined.44
The Colombian proposal was supported by statements by each of the
South American co-sponsors. The Venezuelan ambassador appealed to the
chair of the Commission to get involved in the negotiations to help resolve
the breach which had developed between the parties, so that the Commission
would not be compelled to take a roll call vote on either the original U.S.
resolution or the South American proposal. Just before the Commission broke
for lunch, a member of the U.S. delegation, presented the U.S. position in
public, so that governments could consider the position over the lunch hour.
The United States proposed to amend its original resolution in several re-
spects: First, the resolution would no longer urge the Cuban authorities permit
the International Committee of the Red Cross access to Cuban prisons.
Second, and more importantly, the resolution would be amended to take
account of the Cuban invitation. The critical new language authorized "the
Chairman of the Commission in consultation with the Bureau to select a
Working Group of five members acting in their personal capacities to join
the Chair of the forty-fourth session of the Commission who will examine
the human rights situation on the basis of all information that it will seek
and receive from all sources including a visit in accordance with established
procedures." The new U.S. proposal made it clear that the United Nations
would pay for the visit, that the Working Group would publish its findings,
and that the findings would be considered under agenda item 12 relating
to gross violations of human rights in all parts of the world.
Chairman Ambassador Alioune Sene of Senegal, contrary to the accepted
procedure, entered into the stalled negotiations throughout the lunch hour
and continued after the Commission had formally convened with one of the
vice-chairman presiding. The Commission continued to transact its business
on other matters, including the adoption of resolutions on other country
situations, such as, Afghanistan, Iran, and Chile.
While the other business was being transacted, small groups of diplomats
stood around the Commission room and in the lounge outside discussing
the situation. The other resolutions seemed to pale in comparison. Indeed,
most of the other resolutions had been discussed so fully that they were
adopted without a vote.
Finally, at 7:00 p.m. Ambassador Sene resumed chairing the Commis-
sion, and began by saying, "Returning to agenda item 12." The chairman
of the Commission then made a proposal to the Commission. He assured
the Commission that the visit of the Working Group to Cuba would be
without limits. He did not, however, make any reference to the established
fact-finding procedures of the United Nations. He then asked a representative
44. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/L.103.
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of the Centre for Human Rights to explain the financial implications which
gave some picture of the sort of visit which was envisioned. The financial
implications assumed a one week meeting of the Working Group in Geneva
to adopt rules and prepare for the visit in May-June, a one week visit to
Cuba in July-August, and a one week meeting in Geneva in January 1989
to adopt the Working Group's report.45 Also, the statement of the Centre
made clear that the United Nations would pay for the visit and that the
Working Group would be assisted by the UN staff. Based on those oral
assurances, the chair asked the Commission to adoptthe Colombian proposal
by consensus. Everyone in the room held their breath to see if there would
be an objection; the chair did not delay for long before declaring the proposal
adopted by consensus. 46
After the decision had been adopted, the chair made a further statement
assuring that the members of the Working Group would be impartial, pro-
fessional, and fully in accord with the standards of the Commission. He
stopped short of stating that the members of the Working Group would be
acting in their personal capacity. The chair stated that he assumed the Cuban
resolution against the United States be withdrawn. The South American
nations which had co-sponsored the Colombian proposal made speeches
thanking and praising the chair for his assistance in resolving the difficulties.
Ambassador Valladares also thanked Chairman Sene and stated that the
Working Group would conduct its visit according to established UN fact-
finding procedures. Valladares also withdrew the original U.S. resolution-
relieving the tension. Finally, at about 7:25 p.m. the Cuban delegate took
the floor to thank the chair and the South American nations who had acted
out of a sense of solidarity among Latin nations. Cuba did not object to the
statements of Chairman Sene or Ambassador Valladares concerning the mo-
dalities for the visit. Cuba also did not formally withdraw its resolution against
the United States, although the resolution was never brought to a decision.
Ambassador Valladares immediately left the Commission session to hold
a press conference. Valladares claimed victory. Cuba had been compelled
by the impending success of the original U.S. resolution to invite a delegation
from the Commission to visit Cuba and see for themselves the violations of
human rights in that country. Valladares noted that Fidel Castro had earlier
said the United Nations would never be permitted to enter Cuba, except by
invading the island. The adoption of the resolution by consensus strengthened
the Commission's initiative. Cuba would be considered next year under
agenda item 12 for gross violations, just like Afghanistan, El Salvador, and
Iran.
The Cubans were also pleased by the result of Thursday night. They
45. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/L.104 (1988).
46. CHR Dec. 1988/106, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/88, at 168, 230-35 (1988).
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were able to avoid a vote on the resolution proposed by the United States.
In addition, they had established a strong base of political support within
the Latin American nations.
The next morning the agreement of Thursday night immediately began
to unravel. The staff of the Human Rights Centre had prepared a tentative
agenda for the 1989 session of the Commission. 47 The staff had placed the
expected report of the Working Group on Cuba under item 12 which deals
with gross violations and under which the decision to send the Working
Group had been adopted. There were rumors that the South American nations
would propose that the Working Group on Cuba should report under the
agenda items for advisory services or that the Working Group's report should
be considered under agenda item 3, which would permit the Commission
at the 1989 session to decide how the report would be considered.
Once again, the business of the Commission rumbled forward, but the
real work on the Cuban issue was being discussed in small groups of dip-
lomats around the meeting room, outside in the lounge, and in the office
of the chairman of the Commission. Ordinarily, the last Friday of the Com-
mission is a rather dull day. The report of the Commission is adopted section
by section without much debate, and any left over rights of reply are heard.
The meeting rarely extends beyond 6:00 p.m., because many people have
bags to pack and airplanes to catch. In 1988 the Commission Was still meeting
well after 7:00 p.m. The Commission had handled nearly all of its other
business, and still the agenda dispute over Cuba was being discussed. At a
little after 8:00 p.m. the Colombian delegation formally proposed that the
Working Group's report on Cuba should be considered under agenda item
3 and not under 12. The secretary of the Commission explained that the
report had been placed under item 12 (gross violations) because the decision
to send the Working Group had been made under that item. Mexico, Ar-
gentina, India, Pakistan, and several countries, however, stressed the lan-
guage of the decision itself, which said,
That the Chairman of the Commission, together with the five other members of
the mission, shall prepare a report to be submitted for consideration by the
Commission, which shall decide on the manner in which the report will be
examined.
Mexico at one point even argued that the decision allowed the Com-
mission in 1989 to decide "how or if" the Working Group's report would
be considered. The debate continued. The United States did not speak, until
after Belgium, Norway, and the United Kingdom had spoken to support the
agenda as prepared by the staff. It was a surprise when Nigeria spoke in
favor of the Mexican proposal. The Japanese delegate appealed for a res-
47. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/L.1.
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olution of this procedural problem, because he had the previous night already
sent a telex to his government in Tokyo reporting that the Commission had
been a success. He did not want to have to write a second telex saying that
he had been wrong the night before.
The debate continued until about 9:00 p.m. Venezuela once again
appealed to the chair to try to resolve the impasse. Argentina asked for a
"five minute recess" to try to obtain a consensus on some proposal. The
U.S. delegation stated that the hour was late. The session was scheduled to
end at 9:00 p.m., and simultaneous language interpretation would ordinarily
end at that hour. The U.S. delegate said that there had been extensive efforts
at a compromise, and the U.S. delegation did not believe that a compromise
was possible; the United States called for a vote and opposed the recess.
Norway asked whether there would be language interpretation when the
Commission reconvened. The chair stated that he hoped the UN Under-
Secretary General, who was present, would arrange for continued servicing
of the meeting. Finally, the Commission could hot even agree as to whether
there should be a recess for further negotiation. A vote was taken with
members raising their voting cards. The Commission decided to break for
five minutes, which stretched to forty-five minutes.
At about 9:40 p.m. the Commission reconvened. The chair proposed a
decision whereby the report of the Working Group would remain on the
agenda under item 12, but the annotated agenda for 1989 would reflect a
statement made earlier by the chair to the effect that the Commission would
have the authority under item 3 to determine how the Working Group on
Cuba's report would be considered. Again, the chair asked for his proposal
to be adopted by consensus. 48 Ambassador Leandro Despouy of Argentina
thanked the chair for his efforts to resolve the dispute. Everyone in the room
appeared to hold his breath in apprehension of any objection. No one
objected and the proposal was adopted by consensus.
Finally, at nearly 10:00 p.m. the Commission was ready to conclude.
A representative of each of the five regional groups thanked the chair for
his work at the Commission. While these speeches were an ordinary for-
mality, there was a sense that Chairman Sene's personal influence and efforts
had been critical in permitting the Commission to complete its work. Chair-
man Sene ended the Commission with extensive final remarks; everyone
politely remained in his seat and listened. The chairman declared the meeting
adjourned. The delegates shook hands, exchanged addresses, and headed
home.
48. See U.N. Doc. ECN.4/1988/88, at 277 (1988).
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